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1 .  Work of  Aura 
 
ow do you picture your funeral? 
If you think you’ ll opt for a civil 
ceremony, then you know there 
will be relatively improvised 
speeches and applauses: the impromptu is 
likely to prevail. There will be no structur-
ing ritual, no formal apparatus to make the 
pain bearable. And yet the same might hap-
pen in a religious ceremony, if it were to 
mimic the civil rite and acquire its uncertain-
ties and difficulties: imagine it took place in 
an ugly church with poor ornaments, and 
the speeches did not make use of a high reg-
ister but of everyday language. The experi-
ment of the funeral is somewhat extreme 
but, in the end, appropriate (as it affects eve-
ryone) to address the difficulties of sacred 
art – currently confused with profane art, 
which is not in its golden age either. 
Why is it so? Camille Paglia, in Glittering 
Images: A Journey Through Art from Egypt to 
Star Wars,1 speaks of a crisis of the spirit. 
Gone are the days of the cathedrals, and re-
ligion is no longer the subject of art. Accord-
ing to the author, this is manifested at a mac-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Paglia 2012. 
roscopic level in the oblivion of the canon 
(people don’ t understand an annunciation 
or a flight into Egypt because they do not 
know what they are). I would add that the 
main client of art has changed, as it is no 
longer the Church but the government: art-
ists now have to simulate social interests just 
as they had to simulate religious interests in 
the past. And the public does no longer go 
see art in the church, but at exhibitions, 
pushed by the media and advertisements. As 
a result, the only occasions in which there is 
talk of sacred art is when it comes to provo-
cations, such as Piss Christ by Serrano, Kip-
penberger’ s crucified frog, or Cattelan’ s 
John Paul II crushed by a meteorite. 
To counter this trend, the Catholic 
Church is now seeking to recover a relation-
ship with art that would not be subordinated 
or mimetic, by designing a Vatican pavilion 
at the Venice Biennale or involving contem-
porary artists in ancient churches (think of 
the altar by Parmeggiani in the cathedral of 
Reggio Emilia, Kounellis’ bishop’ s chair or 
the candlestick by Spalletti). The results are 
not obvious, because the difficulties of sa-
cred art are only the strongest symptom of 
the difficulties of art in general – as authori-
tative and even conservative commentators 
have recently pointed out, see Marc Fuma-
roli,2 Jean Clair3 and Roger Scruton.4 Art, in 
fact, seems to be realizing Nietzsche’ s 
prophecy about humanity after Copernicus: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Claire 2011. 
3 Fumaroli 2009. 
4 Scruton 2009. 
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it is “rolling off toward the x”, without an 
end and without an orientation. 
Now, it is easy to see that many sectors of 
contemporary art are in crisis. It is even eas-
ier to see that the “return to religion” talked 
about for the past twenty years has largely 
been a false alarm: it has not lead to any real 
change of customs or beliefs, which remain 
secular in all respects. However, I find it too 
easy and simplistic to establish (as Paglia 
does) a direct relationship between a spiri-
tual crisis and an aesthetic crisis. There 
surely is a relationship between the two but, 
if anything, it is the reverse of what the 
author posits: the hyper-spiritualization of 
art, become conceptual, is what has caused 
the aesthetic crisis. This phenomenon was 
described very well by Hegel: while ancient 
classical art develops an “aesthetic religion” 
characterized by a strict correspondence be-
tween form and content, in modern romantic 
art content (the spirit, the concept) prevails 
over form. Christ on the cross is not nice to 
look at, what matters is the spiritual signifi-
cance of the scene: here, in this extreme con-
ceptualism, we have the most powerful ante-
cedent of Duchamp. 
All romantic art – as well as its heirs, the 
avant-garde, which not coincidentally 
mainly took place in the Christian world (to 
my knowledge there are no Islamic, Jewish, 
Confucian, Taoist, or Hindu avant-gardes) 
– develops this hyper-spiritual vocation. 
The claim made by contemporary visual art 
that beauty is not at its centre5 is a statement !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Benjamin 1968. 
of hyper-conceptuality. It is not true, as is 
always repeated following Benjamin, that in 
the age of mechanical reproduction art has 
lost the aura resulting from uniqueness. 
What has happened is exactly the opposite, 
the artwork is now essentially a work of 
aura, the result of a fully spiritual consecra-
tion by which any object is transformed into 
artwork, museums are transformed into 
temples, visitors turn into pilgrims and peni-
tents, and art dealers become merchants of 
aura.6 
Assuming that, if exposed in a favourable 
location and with the appropriate ritual, any-
thing can become a work of art, means plac-
ing transubstantiation within artistic produc-
tion: the artist consecrates any object, trans-
forming it into an artwork, through reading 
a devotional text written by an art-critic. So 
it is true that there is no more sacred art 
(with sacred subjects) and that we no longer 
know how to build beautiful churches. But 
in new and often beautiful cathedrals – mu-
seums – we are engaging in a perpetual ado-
ration. If this is the case, then, art is not 
dead, but more alive than ever, and indeed it 
has taken the place of religion. 
One can always object to this interpreta-
tion that “conceptual” is not equivalent to 
“spiritual,” that the spirit may be mystery 
and revelation, while the concept is trans-
parency, clarity, and often a futile game. It 
might also be objected that the aura of con-
ceptual works is an aura of plastic. Sure, but 
the problem is that in order to restore the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Dal Lago – Giordano 2006. 
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myth – perhaps to create a “new mythol-
ogy” as the romantics dreamed two centu-
ries ago – the will to do so isn’ t enough. Af-
ter all, the whole story is already written in 
War and Peace: at the eve of the battle of 
Borodino, Napoleon, the bourgeois and En-
lightened emperor, contemplates the picture 
of his son, the King of Rome. His opponent, 
Kutusov, kneels in front of the icons. The 
outcome of the battle is uncertain, while that 
of the war will be disastrous for Napoleon. 
But in the long run, in the two centuries that 
separate us from Borodino, Napoleon’ s 
principles have had the upper hand. We are 
now more able to see the limits of those 
principles, in art, economy and politics, as 
well as in our own lives. But we are also 
aware (or at least this is my steadfast belief) 
that spirituality and the divine are bound to a 
power we have to acknowledge, but with 
which we can not reconcile if not in an illu-
sory form, sacrificing the values, merits and 
pains of modernity. 
  
 
2 .  Contractual  Art  
 
t is important to define the meaning of 
“concept” in the phrase “conceptual 
art.” In what sense is Duchamp’ s bottle 
rack more conceptual than the School 
of Athens by Raphael, who manages to em-
body in the single gesture of Aristotle’ s 
half-raised hand the via media character of 
ethical virtues? In hindsight, the notion of 
conceptual art is a legal concept: if we take 
the couple “law and art”,7 we will notice that 
the former is not extrinsic to the latter (un-
like what would happen if, say, we tried to 
explain artworks through their authors’ pa-
thologies according to the couple “psychia-
try and art.”)  
For the past century conceptual art has, in 
fact, been contractual: it deals with the eco-
nomic data (the world of art is above all the 
art market) and seeks to broaden the defini-
tion of art, renegotiating the implicit con-
tract between buyer, author and user to the 
point of essentially becoming a contract it-
self. In fact, the only concept used by con-
ceptual-contractual art is, after all, the law of 
art, the canonical idea that an artwork is a 
physical thing, made by an author and en-
dowed with an attractive appearance. There-
fore, it is necessary to contradict the canons, 
move around them, expand them, remove 
them, and all this, rather perversely, happens 
through a tool that is traditionally associated 
with the canon and legality: the contract. 
The powers of the contract are great, as it 
has a performative dimension and allows one 
to do things with words, as suggested by the 
English philosopher John L. Austin,8 the 
theoretician of speech acts, who noted that 
the words “I do” at a wedding do not merely 
describe a ceremony, but produce two new 
social objects, a husband and a wife. The 
same thing systematically happens with 
documents, which allow one to certify, 
document, archive, name, and so forth ac-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Donati 2012, Ajani-Donati (eds), 2011. 
8 Austin 1962. 
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cording to a dual mode which I believe can 
be traced back to the following: “weak 
document” (record of a fact) and “strong 
document” (inscription of an act). To be 
clear, all the artists that record performances 
otherwise destined to disappear produce 
weak documents. The same happens when 
artists – such as Gordon Matta-Clark, who 
makes collages with legal papers – take ad-
vantage of the aesthetic appeal of paperwork 
and the magic power of archive. 
But documents can be used in a stronger 
form, that is, to literally produce acts: Theo-
dore Fu Wan contractually changes his 
name to Saskatche Wan, Alix Lambert gets 
married with five different wives in six 
months, Maria Eichhorn conceives of her 
own artistic activity as the drafting of con-
tracts in order to protect urban areas threat-
ened by speculation. The conferring power 
of the document is at the heart of practices 
such as those by Stefan Bruggemann and 
Robert Barry, who have two of their works 
assigned by contract every five years to one 
or the other. Similarly, exploiting the laws of 
copyright, Philippe Parreno and Peter 
Huyge acquire the rights to use a Manga fig-
ure. The contract can go up to the staging of 
a subversion of the rules that are no longer 
those of art, but of the Criminal Code, such 
as when the artist gives the order to rob a 
grocery store, or, as in “Corruption Con-
tract” by the group Superflex, the buyer – in 
obvious derogation from the standard the-
ory of beauty as a symbol of moral goodness 
– is committed to extort or bribe. 
One can also create artworks by a mere 
contractual fiat. In 1959 Yves Klein made 
”Empty Artist,” an exhibition without 
works, in which the user was issued a con-
tract for the sale of a “zone of immaterial 
pictorial sensibility”. Much later, in 2010, 
Etienne Chambaud made a work that con-
sists only of contracts, certificates and state-
ments of authenticity. Similarly, the contract 
can turn the author into an artwork, as in the 
arrangement by which Jill Magid gives a 
specialized company a mandate to transform 
its charred remains into a diamond. But the 
extreme case is perhaps that of Robert Mor-
ris’ 1963 contract, which consists of two 
parts: on the left, an iron plate with a few 
lines engraved on it, on the right a statement 
in which the artist withdraws the artwork 
status from the artwork itself, transferring 
the artistic aura onto the document.   
Immanuel Kant said that the character of 
art consists in making people think. But 
what thoughts are aroused by these works? 
Questions of an essentially legal nature. For 
example: who is the author, if she merely 
gives instructions for others to make the 
work? She can be intimidating if, as Seth 
Siegelaub did, she prescribes in the contract 
that even the slightest change involves an ir-
reversible alteration of the artwork. She can 
even be despotic, in a perverse way: this is 
the case of Daniel Buren who rigorously 
avoids signing or authenticating his works. 
And again, can we say that the curator of an 
exhibition or a museum is an author, when 
his responsibility goes far beyond the man-
agement of the exhibition space? (For in-
stance, an artist like Cattelan has co-curated 
the Berlin Biennial in 2006 with Massimil-
iano Gioni). 
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And is the performance really an immate-
rial artwork that escapes the market? It was 
so according to the original ideology, but 
now the world is full of recordings of per-
formances. Indeed, the world is full of 
documents, as in the philosophical conversa-
tions with Ian Wilson, of which only a piece 
of paper with a signature is left. There are 
even “scripta”, works that can be assembled 
and unassembled following instructions for 
use. Or works that only consist in docu-
ments, such as the sheet of the complaint 
lodged by Cattelan at the police headquar-
ters in Forlì, reporting the theft of an invisi-
ble work of art from his car. 
However, contemporary art simply 
brings to the fore a character proper of the 
artworks of all time and type. A documental 
aspect has always defined the horizon of art, 
as it has to do with the establishment of so-
cial objects in general. So, like any other so-
cial object, the artwork is defined by a law 
which I have tried to formalize in the terms 
of Object = Inscribed Act. That is to say 
that social objects are the result of social acts 
(such as to involve at least two people) char-
acterized by the fact of being recorded, on a 
piece of paper, a computer file, or even only 
in people’ s minds. Therefore, the dimension 
of the contract is not a break with the es-
sence of traditional art, which as such postu-
lates the cooperation between author and 
user suggested over thirty years ago by Um-
berto Eco in Lector in fabula.9 The full reali-
zation of expectations, even in traditional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Eco 1979. 
art, often led to a factor of surprise, a slight 
transgression of the rule, so as to give a 
breath of authorship and novelty to the arts 
that (unlike heavily coded traditions) call for 
such things. 
The contemporary variant is precisely the 
thrill of the contract, in which the artist feels 
the more revolutionary the more he devel-
ops the sophistication of a shyster. Here 
transgression and the surprise element be-
come the most important features of the 
work, and the bureaucratic frisson takes the 
place of other elements (information, emo-
tion, aesthetic satisfaction) that were consti-
tutive of traditional artworks. The romantic 
dream of turning the world into a work of 
art was realized in the paperwork, where art 
really comes down to life. The bartender 
that does not give you the receipt is poten-
tially an absolute performer, and the event 
would be even more sublime and complete if 
it is accompanied by a report to the financial 
police. 
We all await the time when a condomin-
ium assembly will become a work of art, 
whose vestige, the minutes, will be hung on 
the wall as a decoration. In contractual art, 
an old cartoon by Giuseppe Novello comes 
true. The cartoon depicts a young man 
whose noble and cultured family wanted him 
to be a composer, but who at night – under 
the frowning eyes of Beethoven’ s bust – 
gave vent to his true Muse: accounting. 
Nothing wrong with that. After all, Jeff 
Koons worked in the stock market. Perfec-
tion would be reached if Cattelan received a 
chair of commercial law drawing on the ex-
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pertise accumulated in his years of artistic 
militancy. 
 
 
3.  From the Vittoriano to the Urinal  
 
nd beauty? It is no longer a prob-
lem, of course, provided that it has 
ever been one. Since 1993, in Bos-
ton, there has been a MOBA, a 
Museum of Bad Art which organises exhibi-
tions and conferences developing an idea 
that is simple but efficacious: take some bad 
paintings and call them by their real name. 
This doesn’ t always work, some pieces are 
not that bad after all, and overall one gets 
the impression that the percentage of bad art 
is not significantly greater than that present 
in many museums of fine arts, both ancient 
and modern. What matters, though, is that 
MOBA ironizes about what for a century 
now has been the fundamental aesthetic 
creed of avant-gardes, which I would call 
“dogma of aesthetic indifference”. That is, 
the thesis according to which beauty is no 
longer the primary objective of what used to 
be called “fine arts” to distinguish them 
from useful arts.  
This aesthetic (or more exactly anaes-
thetic) creed comes from afar and goes back 
at least to Romanticism, characterised by 
Hegel (who didn’ t really like the Roman-
tics) as a prevalence of content over from, as 
a prearranged and strongly wanted dishar-
mony. It is not by chance that in 1853 a 
Hegelian, Rosenkranz, wrote Aesthetics of 
the Ugliness,10 grasping the spirit of the age: 
beauty is not needed, aura is enough, al-
though this took place in the epoch of da-
guerreotype – that is, of that technical re-
producibility which, according to Benjamin, 
endorses the end of artistic aura. This is a 
precocious and evident proof, I believe, of 
the thesis I am trying to defend, namely that 
the disappearance of beauty and the imposi-
tion of aura are two concomitant phenom-
ena.  
 Nonetheless, like in any religion, the 
dogma of aesthetic indifference has many 
more followers in theory than in practice. 
When writing an essay on aesthetics, one is 
always ready to affirm that what one is deal-
ing with is a conceptual experience in which 
beauty is a fossil out of place. One is not as 
ready, though, to affirm the same when buy-
ing a table or an armchair, a carpet or a 
dress: then the requirement of aesthetic 
pleasantness stays unchanged. It is not hard 
to recognise a contradiction here (or, to stick 
to religious jargon, a double truth), so that 
we have an age, ours, that carefully culti-
vates the myth of beauty and yet easily ac-
cepts that what used to be called “fine arts” 
no longer have beauty as their primary ob-
jective. 
Thus we have, on the one hand, the most 
beautiful women and men in history, the 
best-finished objects, the most-selected food, 
incomparably better wines than all the wines 
mankind has ever drunk – and works of art 
that are ugly, on purpose so, or unkempt, or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Rosenkranz 1853. 
A 
ARTICLES 
PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS   ISSUE VI – NUMBER 2 – SUMMER 2014 
10!
meaningless, or at least an art that thinks it 
can be ugly because it sees itself as intelli-
gent. And since looks (and taste) still matter, 
the consolation for visitors is offered by gal-
leries, which are beautiful (we shall come 
back to this later, as it’ s not a detail). Or 
perhaps the gratification lies in the free white 
wine and cheese you are offered at inaugura-
tions (unlike the cinema, where you’ re the 
one to pay for wine and cheese, if you want 
them, since supposedly the aesthetic gratifi-
cation comes from the show). Now, there 
are people convinced that between what you 
see in a gallery and what you put into your 
own house there is an abyss. I (and I doubt I 
am the only one) believe it is not so, also be-
cause many works are destined to enter peo-
ple’ s houses, just like many other handi-
works. In the following pages I will there-
fore try to fight the correlated dogmas of 
aesthetic indifference and auratic omnipo-
tence attempting an answer to the question: 
what can be done to avoid that any MOMA 
or MOCA or MACBA or MADRE or 
MAMBO becomes indistinguishable from a 
MOBA? 
Despite the appearances, the MOBA be-
longs to an ancient tradition, as its predeces-
sors can already be found in the situation de-
scribed by Carlo Dossi when commenting 
on the sketches for the Vittoriano in I mat-
toidi: al primo concorso pel monumento in 
Roma a Vittorio Emanuele II (literally, The 
nutcases: for the first competition for the Victor 
Emmanuel II monument in Rome)11: “Èccomi !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Dossi 1884. 
a voi, pòveri bozzetti fuggiti od avviati al 
manicomio, dinanzi ai quali chi prende la 
vita sul tràgico passa facendo atti di sdegno e 
chi la prende, come si deve, a gioco, si ab-
bandona a momenti di clamorosa ilarità”.12 
This was in 1884, that is, in an age of bad 
taste and eclecticism possibly produced by 
the vast photographic material at disposal (it 
is on this side, rather than that of the loss of 
aura, that we should measure the impact of 
technical reproducibility on art). Beauty was 
still being searched-for, but it wasn’ t found, 
and the outcome was the very white, marble 
writing machine that we can still see in Pi-
azza Venezia in Rome – which is not so bad, 
after all, if we compare it with other rejected 
sketches that Dossi laughed about. 
Also, it is not so bad when compared with 
many works of art that fill galleries and mu-
seums, and that appeal to what I propose we 
call Great Conceptual Art: the art that has 
cultivated the dogmas of aesthetic indiffer-
ence and auratic omnipotence. If the works 
of the “nutcases” were often ugly but not on 
purpose, those of the Great Conceptual Art 
are just as ugly, but purposely so. One 
would be tempted to see in this an extra re-
sponsibility but instead, with a somehow mi-
raculous proceeding (as it has to do with 
transfiguration) it is not so. While laughing 
at the Vittoriano, scorning its ugliness and 
pitying its author are all accepted attitudes, if !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 “Here I am, you poor sketches escaped from – or 
made in – the madhouse, before whom those who 
take life tragically pass showing disdain, and those 
who take it (as they should) as a game abandon 
themselves to moments of clamorous hilarity”.  
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one risked doing the same with Great Con-
ceptual Art one would be in trouble, accused 
of nostalgia, incompetence, bad taste and 
aesthetic insensibility (and it’ s bizarre, given 
that this art does not aspire to beauty). 
Beauty is no longer art’ s business and if you 
didn’ t get that you’ re an ignoramus. 
If you think about it, this doctrine it is bi-
zarre because it would be like saying that 
health is not medicine’ s priority. Given that 
Great Conceptual Art comes not long after 
the Vittoriano, someone could malevolently 
think that the dogma of aesthetic indiffer-
ence is a late version of the fable of the fox 
and the grapes. Yet the intimidated audience 
accepts and endures. They go to exhibitions, 
applaud and buy if they can, proving to be 
much less self-confident than the nineteenth 
century bourgeoisie, that would perhaps 
scorn Impressionism, but at least, in doing 
so, showed that it had its own taste. Great 
Conceptual Art users can, at most, say to 
themselves: “I could have made this”. But 
they are wrong: the endeavour is far beyond 
their reach, it is very, and romantically, 
monumental. In the age when nutcases were 
competing for the Vittoriano, Nietzsche 
wrote Beyond Good and Evil proposing a 
transvaluation of all values. An undoubtedly 
vast project, that nonetheless was realised in 
art. When the last unprepared visitors – 
those ready to shout “Ugly! Ugly!”, in the 
right or the wrong, in front of ugly or beau-
tiful works – were gone, a spell was cast so 
that their very sons or grandchildren say 
“Beautiful! Beautiful!” before works that 
have only one declared feature, namely that 
of not aspiring to beauty.  
The Zarathustra of this transvaluation 
was obviously Duchamp, thirty years after 
the nutcases of the Vittoriano. But 
Duchamp’ s genius did not consist, as is 
sometimes believed, of his breaking with the 
past. Rather, in the opposite way, it con-
sisted of his art’ s ultimate continuity with it. 
His urinal, as well as the Mona Lisa with 
moustaches, draws together the threads of 
the aesthetic frustrations accumulated by 
generations of eclecticism and pompierism, 
together with a forced and semi-religious 
cult of Great Non Conceptual Art. Are you 
tired of showing an aesthetic devotion that 
doesn’ t belong to you before the Mona 
Lisa? Don’ t worry, draw some moustaches 
on her and you shall be saved by the inter-
vention of Great Conceptual Art. Are you 
fed up with works that struggle to be beauti-
ful and are just vulgar or ordinary? Again, 
don’ t worry: take a urinal, or a bottle rack 
(curious tool, by the way) or a bicycle 
wheel, exhibit it in a pertinent environment 
(a gallery or a museum), give it a title and 
sign it: you’ ll have realised the marvellous 
conceptual transubstantiation thanks to 
which a common object becomes a work of 
aura. From this point of view, applying the 
dogma of aesthetic indifference and auratic-
ity at all costs is crucial, so as to avoid some 
incompetent thinking that the miracle de-
pends on the action of aesthetic properties 
instead of the conceptual invention. Here’ s 
the first difference from the Vittoriano, a 
monument that loved beauty, despite not be-
ing loved back.  
There is a second difference. Dossi could 
easily laugh at the Vittoriano, whereas with 
ARTICLES 
PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS   ISSUE VI – NUMBER 2 – SUMMER 2014 
12!
Duchamp’ s urinal one needs to be very se-
rious and thoughtful, admiring and concen-
trated. Otherwise one risks ending up like 
Franti, who in Cuore is defined a “villain” 
for smiling when the teacher narrates the fu-
nerals of king Umberto. Like in every mira-
cle, a good deal of faith is necessary on the 
part of the observers. You have to believe it. 
But once you do, then any transvaluation is 
truly possible. It’ d like to demonstrate this 
with an anecdote. A few years ago an impor-
tant foundation of Great Conceptual Art 
asked me to organise a cycle of conferences 
in conjunction with the exhibition of an art-
ist who proposed, I was told, a profound re-
flection on violence. When I requested to 
know what the meditation was about they 
explained to me that the artist had gone to a 
slaughterhouse in Mexico and had killed, 
with a hammer, a dozen horses there. The 
reflection on violence consisted of the re-
cordings of the massacre. I pointed out that I 
couldn’ t see the meditative side, given that 
(if words have any meaning at all) it was not 
a reflection but an action, a cruel and ex-
tremely violent one, a kind of snuff movie 
against animals. I was then told that those 
animals were going to be slaughtered any-
way.  
So if the artist had gone to the showers in 
Auschwitz hammering to death the wretched 
people who entered (and who were going to 
die anyway) maybe some critics or curators 
would have said that the artist’ s was a pro-
found reflection on violence. The entire 
conversation took place, as it had to (we 
shall get back to this point, which might 
seem lateral or environmental but it’ s cru-
cial in its being lateral or environmental), in 
a white room, minimal and very elegant like 
an Apple Store, and the people talking to me 
were all educated, well-mannered and kind 
men and (mostly) women. I was the ill-
mannered one, unwilling to understand. On 
my way back home, I wondered if the 
transvaluation of all values wasn’ t moving 
from aesthetics to ethics, because perhaps 
aesthetic atrophy, the habit of swallowing 
anything, has started to unleash a form of 
moral atrophy.  
 
4.  Intimidation and Indulgence 
 
n the end the exhibition didn’ t take 
place, as is was prohibited by animal 
rights activists and by the superinten-
dent. I wonder: if it had taken place, 
what would the artist have done? Would he 
have stood at the door of the gallery holding 
a hammer? Maybe, but even without armed 
artists welcoming them, visitors normally 
seem quite intimidated in art galleries: they 
often pay to see an exhibition, and yet they 
walk around with a shy and respectful atti-
tude. One may wonder how much fear peo-
ple have, and who exactly is threatening 
them. Also, one may wonder whether it is 
humanly possible to find everything beauti-
ful: at a restaurant or in a shop that is never 
the case, as there are always things one does 
not like. In art, however, everything is taken 
to be beautiful, and this – for a further para-
dox – happens just at the time when Great 
Conceptual art imposes the canon of aes-
thetic indifference. And yet this paradox 
ceases to be when one realizes that the aes-
I 
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thetic indifference hides an auratic omnipo-
tence. 
One is tempted to reach a very simple 
conclusion: in this transfiguration (as in all 
transformations) not only is there circum-
vention but also a good deal of social intimi-
dation. This intimidating factor relies on the 
solid bourgeois element that thinkers from 
Nietzsche to Bourdieu have called “distinc-
tion”.13 It is not distinguished not to appreci-
ate the slaughter of horses. It is not distin-
guished to show hesitation in the face of a 
work that consists (I happened to see it) of a 
chainsaw put into a boat – I guess it was 
meant to refer to the transience of all human 
affairs, somehow like a Stilleben created by 
Leroy Merlin. The chainsaw in the dinghy 
was the repetitive and almost paroxysmal 
version of the readymade, almost a hundred 
years later. Now, I know that this observa-
tion is far from original, but the readymade 
truly seems to be a gimmick that changes 
with time, with iteration and by imitation, in 
an intellectual swindle with motivations of 
economic interest. At its heart there is a 
powerful intuition. At a time when the nut-
cases of the Vittoriano are looking for 
beauty in vain and are committed to cover 
anything up with an aesthetic patina, the 
readymade proposes a radical gesture and 
says that the search is useless: anything can 
be a work of art. 
The first movement, then, is desecration. 
The artwork has nothing special about it, it 
can be anything: at least nominally, it can be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Bourdieu 1987. 
a thing without aura or nor art. In reality, 
though, it isn’ t true that anything can be a 
work of art, because it would be difficult to 
turn a natural event such as a hurricane into 
a work of art. The same goes for an ideal ob-
ject such as an equilateral triangle (at most, 
there would be a concrete object, the design 
of the equilateral triangle, and that, not the 
triangle itself, would be the artwork).14 
Rather, what Duchamp suggests is some-
thing very reasonable that I personally fully 
agree with: the artwork is first and foremost a 
thing, with certain dimensions, features etc. 
Indeed, it is from time immemorial that mu-
seums (and the royal galleries that preceded 
them) have included all sorts of things that 
were not intended for aesthetic contempla-
tion: weapons, buckles, tombstones, and of 
course human bodies (such as in Egyptian 
museums, which show how body art has an 
ancient soul). 
The real desecration, therefore, lies not so 
much in the idea that anything can be a work 
of art, but rather in saying that, whatever it 
is, the work of art can afford to be ugly, i.e. 
not to aspire to beauty, to the status of what 
Duchamp called “retinal art”.15 Besides, this 
does not apply to other things of supposed 
aesthetic value, such as design objects. 
Therefore, Duchamp’ s real stroke of gen-
ius, much more than the readymade, was the 
practical elaboration of the thesis of aesthetic 
indifference as auratic omnipotence. This 
thesis proves to be valuable and salvific in an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 I have developed this point in Ferraris 2007. 
15 Cabanne 1967.  
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age of aesthetic confusion, in which the 
eclecticism of many traditions generates the 
situation described by Gadda in Acquainted 
with Grief: the villas in Brianza “had some-
thing of the pagoda and something of the 
spinning mill, and they were also a compro-
mise between the Alhambra and the Krem-
lin”.16 In this grab-bag of styles, classes, 
tastes and cultures, no one could be sure of 
one’ s own taste, and everyone had reason-
able grounds to think one was wrong: the es-
timators of Impressionism felt insecure be-
cause now that taste had been overcome by 
Cubism, the lovers of Art Pompier felt the 
same because it was considered “poor in 
spirit” by the enthusiasts of Impressionism 
and Cubism, and so forth. On the one hand, 
therefore, there is the path that leads from 
the Vittoriale to the Vittoriano: that is, the 
inclusive and syncretic path which collects 
all kinds of horrors in a museum. On the 
other hand, there is Duchamp’ s break with 
the past: what matters is not the beauty, but 
the concept of a work. Once this is clear, 
with a radical Copernican revolution, one 
can stop worrying. 
However, this apparent desecration fully 
capitalizes on the sacred value of art, and 
here lies the crux of intimidation. Just as the 
moustache drawn on the Mona Lisa derive 
their prestige through transgression and lese 
majeste, so the readymade presupposes a 
consecration that is inseparable from its 
desecration. Duchamp, in showing its ob-
jects, exploited the canonical value of art: a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Gadda 1969.  
whole heritage of respectability and auratic-
ity. Bow down to this ugliness, to the dis-
honour of Golgotha (recall that for Hegel 
romanticism found its fundamental para-
digm in the scandal of Christ on the cross),17 
because through this genuflection you shall 
burn incense to the god unknown. Once put 
on a pedestal, the thing becomes an artwork, 
and the devotee will contemplate urinals and 
bottle racks with the same tension and aes-
thetically concentrated attitude dedicated to 
romantic art. In fact, people at exhibitions 
behave exactly as in church, or at Bayreuth: 
they are often silent or whispering, and 
would never dare to act as was common in 
the eighteenth century, an age in which the 
theatre lights were on and people ate while 
watching the show. Even the Chardonnay 
and cheddar that they give you at inaugura-
tions somehow have the function of the 
Eucharist rather than that of “party food” - 
as this would reduce the works to a mere or-
nament and accompaniment. 
Surprisingly, then, while the artist dese-
crates (at least in appearance), the user con-
secrates and feels bestowed with a decisive 
task: making art valuable, auratizing it with 
her faith – just like a meteorite in the desert 
can be transformed by the faithful into the 
symbol of God. The two experiences – the 
rite in the gallery and the one in the desert – 
have a common element: the mystery. It is 
not clear what is expected from the artwork, 
but it’ s a kind of redemption. This is a strik-
ing confirmation of the fact that if technical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Hegel 1975. 
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reproducibility produced a loss of the aura of 
uniqueness, the aura was promptly (and 
much more abundantly) reconstructed by 
the faith of the users. The outward manifes-
tation of devotion is often inadequate, and 
therefore people’ s saying “beautiful, beauti-
ful” is an invocation rather than an apprecia-
tion. Theirs is a strategy of the sublime, 
which not coincidentally was extensively re-
habilitated in the critical discourse on the 
avant-garde. Beauty becomes conspicuous 
by its absence where there’ s nothing beauti-
ful and one is deliberately seeking the com-
mon and the ugly. But this lack, this mis-
match between the concept and the object 
(this is essentially the sublime, especially the 
mathematical one, as Kant theorizes it in the 
Critique of Judgment)18 gives the impression 
to go far beyond the beautiful, because what 
matters are the intentions and thoughts, not 
the sensible appearance – as suggested, with 
terrifying machismo, again by Kant, when 
he said that a woman can be beautiful, but 
only man is sublime.19 
Like all forms of asceticism, intimidation 
involves more than an indulgence: it implies 
spaces in which pleasure is returned and de-
votion is rewarded. It is no coincidence that 
the era of Great Conceptual Art, as that of 
the romantic spirit, is the only one in the his-
tory of taste that has come up with compen-
satory sub-categories: Kitsch, Camp, Pop 
(Pop was assumed by Great Conceptual Art 
with a stratagem, on which we will return !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Kant 1961. 
19 Kant I. 1951: ch. III.  
later). The situation is that of the Vittoriano 
and the Vittoriale: taste is no longer sure of 
itself, or cannot confess its predilections. If 
one wants to listen to Madonna, much pre-
ferring her to Stockhausen, or if one likes 
Campbell’ s soup cans and understands 
nothing of Picasso, and above all if one is 
bored to death watching Duchamp’ s urinal 
for the millionth time, there is a way out: 
one can claim that one likes Kitsch, Camp, 
and Pop – and will make a great impression 
too. This suggests that the common element 
in the compensatory triad Kitsch-Camp-Pop 
is the fear of being judged and (even more) 
of judging, due to an uncertainty of taste. 
For a full “acceptance” of the phenome-
non, one has to wait for its outcome and 
natural development: postmodernism, which 
follows from it in an explicit form, as one 
can read, for example, in a meaningful con-
versation between Charles Jencks and Susan 
Sontag.20 Jencks’ idea is that people ruin 
their lives for the sake of principles and that 
it is better to be nihilists – that is, among 
other things, not to care about those who 
judge us Kitsch or Camp or Pop. The gene-
alogy of postmodern taste is the following. It 
begins with Camp (first English and then 
global), it continues with Kitsch and Pop, 
and culminates with postmodernism and 
weak thought, which returns Camp, Kitsch 
and Pop aficionados (that is, the greater part 
of humanity) some kind of good conscience: 
a kind of absolution or indulgence. “Don’ t 
worry, yours is not bad taste” Or rather, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 The conversation appears in Cleto 2008 (ed). 
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even bad taste has a space and a social dig-
nity: there are essays, handbooks, confer-
ences and conventions about it. 
Like all indulgences, of course, it leaves 
some doubts: does this forgiveness extend to 
Dolce and Gabbana and Lady Gaga? But the 
core of the matter is clear. The Romantics 
wanted a synthesis between philosophy and 
art, they pursued a new mythology. Two 
outcomes were produced by this dream: as-
cetic art, which took its first steps in Beetho-
ven’ s late style, and Kitsch, which originally 
designated the taste of the new bourgeoisie 
of Monaco, who could not suffer Beethoven’ 
quartets but much enjoyed Loden capes. 
With time and industry, with capitalism and 
imperialism, the phenomenon was universal-
ized, reaching stronger cultural circuits and 
more important industrial circuits. This is 
how Friedrich Hölderlin’ s solitary Kitsch 
(leading to the saying that that man dwells 
poetically) was replaced by a Swinging Lon-
don Brian Jones, Gina Lollobrigida, Victor 
Mature, Flash Gordon and the double-
breasted Gianni Agnelli.  
In this context Nietzsche’ s words would 
fit perfectly: “I am all the names in history,” 
as he wrote to Burckhardt.21 Or, as Alberto 
Arbasino wrote in Super Eliogabalo [Super 
Heliogabalus], “Nietzsche, Adorno, Lacan, 
Toto’ .” All camp, no doubt. If this is the 
case, the campest of all is Martin Heidegger, 
in his Tyrolean jacket and a nightcap on his 
head (this was very well grasped in Old 
Masters by Thomas Bernhard, who is also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Nietzsche 1885/1889, letter dated 6 January 1889. 
camp),22 proclaiming that the work of art is 
no less than truth’ s setting-itself-to-work, 
illustrating his thesis with the temple of 
Paestum (originally the Nuremberg Zeppe-
lin Field set up on the pattern of the altar of 
Pergamon to accommodate Hitler’ s 
speeches), the shoes painted by Van Gogh, 
and a poem by Conrad Ferdinand Meyer.23 
 
 
5 .  Matter  Matters  
 
o, this is the crime scene. What to do? 
First of all, against the totalitarianism 
of the concept, it is worth noting that 
there is no art without appeal to per-
ception, namely something that is not 
thought; therefore, the artwork is not simply 
the reminder of the ideas of a guy who, for 
some reason, chose to be an artist rather than 
a philosopher. This is about learning from 
Hegel, not when he speaks of romanticism 
and the death of art, but where he says that 
“sense” is a wonderful word, because it has 
two opposite meanings. On the one hand, it 
refers to the senses – vision, hearing, touch, 
smell, taste – and everything that has to do 
with perception. On the other hand, it indi-
cates the meaning, related to thought, as 
when we say “the sense of life.” It is not sur-
prising that aesthetics – the study of art – 
derives its name from sense perception (ais-
thesis in Greek).24 Trying to prevent the 
solidarity between these two poles, not con-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Bernhard 1985.  
23 Heidegger 2002. 
24 I have developed this point in Ferraris 1997. 
S 
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sidering that matter matters and thinking 
that art is the greater the more it deviates 
from perception: these were the first mis-
takes that led to the dead-end of Great Con-
ceptual Art. And yet, it is by never breaking 
with the senses and with perception that one 
can keep the way open for beauty. 
But there’ s more. As Jane Austen noted 
in her Sense and Sensibility, there is another 
duality similar to the “wonderful” duplicity 
of sense and the senses. The concept must 
always be accompanied by feeling, because 
those who reject feeling in art do so only be-
cause they confuse feeling with sentimental-
ity. The idea is very simple. What do we 
look for when we look at artworks? Mainly 
feelings.25 Otherwise, we would read a trea-
tise instead. It is not truth that we look for in 
art: this is why art has always been linked to 
beauty. By the same token, one can under-
stand why, as we have seen in the case of the 
horse-slaughterer, a certain degree of aes-
thetic atrophy can go hand in hand with 
moral atrophy. 
Finally, there is a third element of Great 
Conceptual Art that we should take into ac-
count. It is the search for a style that is im-
mediately recognizable, even through the 
wide variety of realizations, media, issues. 
They say the style is the man himself. But it 
is also the artwork, because what we expect 
from the works is something unique and in-
dividual, just like people.26 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 I have developed this point in Ferraris 2007. 
26 I have developed this notion in Ferraris 2009. 
Ten, Eleven, Twelve Muses 
 
After the recovery of perception, feeling 
and style, we can move further. Very often 
philosophers, when elaborating theories on 
art, only refer to visual art, as if it were 
paradigmatic. And yet, this is not the case. 
Contemporary visual art and its church-like 
museums leads to a form of consecration, 
rite and admiration governed by the theory 
of aesthetic indifference. But there is a great 
deal of artistic objects (think of videoclips, 
movies, comic books, songs) that occupy 
our lives much more intensely than visual 
art. Such objects follow completely different 
cults, trying to capture the user with the 
most profane things, without being able to 
afford the luxury of aesthetic indifference. 
Given that good will is not enough, it can 
often happen that these objects are ugly or 
nothing special, but the point is that the user 
can say, “I like that” or “I do not like that”, 
while with visual art things are different. So 
the death of art prophesied by Hegel two 
centuries ago was perfectly realized. At least 
it was perfectly realized in visual art, or 
rather, in that part of visual art that under-
stands itself as Great Conceptual Art. The 
other kinds of art are doing well, and new 
ones emerge (think of video clips, or graphic 
novels). It is not the first time that new 
forms of art replace old ones (for example, at 
some point epic poems disappeared and nov-
els appeared) and the really interesting thing 
is wondering what will be next. 
Returning to the issue of aura, we realize 
that perhaps things have gone very differ-
ently from what we expected. Almost a hun-
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dred years ago, Benjamin had argued that 
technical reproducibility would lead to a loss 
of aura. He was referring to the fact that 
paintings were being replaced by photo-
graphs, and the single work was substituted 
by many identical copies. Fifty years ago 
Andy Warhol began to take pictures with 
the Polaroid signing the shots, because those 
photos without negative were unique pieces. 
But, of course, they were also anomalies, be-
cause the ordinary photo has a negative, so it 
is infinitely reproducible – even more so in 
the case of digital photos. I wonder what 
Benjamin (who died in 1940) and Warhol 
(who died in 1987) would have said if they 
had predicted that this reproducibility was 
going to grow enormously, thanks to the In-
ternet. Concretely, if I type “Brillo Box” + 
“Warhol” I will get almost nine thousand 
hits on Google, and if I select the image 
search I will find almost three thousand re-
productions of the Brillo Box, the box of 
steel wool exhibited by Warhol in 1964 and 
considered a pop icon. But if I do this re-
search on my tablet I will have three thou-
sand images available in another place, and 
the same happens if I do the same thing on 
my smartphone. As a result, on the same ta-
ble, I will have virtually nine thousand im-
ages of the Brillo Box and twenty-seven 
websites that talk about it or reproduce it. 
Now, the question is: has this infinite re-
producibility led to the disappearance of art? 
Of course not. In a sense, there is too much 
of it. There are countless works of pop art, 
countless forms of art. The only thing that 
disappeared, or that has dropped drastically 
in the case of reproduced works of art, is the 
price. But it is precisely to remedy this prob-
lem that the work of aura was devised, that 
is, the most spiteful and intractable creation 
of the last century, the most resolute to dis-
please the taste, the most pretentious in de-
claring that beauty is not on top of its aspira-
tions. I once happened to have a discussion 
with a museum director who told me “Of 
course, in order to fully understand these 
works one must be part of the art world.” I 
pointed out that it was not very different 
from saying that to understand certain works 
one must be Aryan. This is an aspect that 
normally, to my knowledge, is not talked 
about, but I think it is crucial. Why do we 
condemn the surplus in industrial production 
and blame the financial capital, while pas-
sively accepting the very same things when 
it comes to art? 
Reconsidering the relationship between 
art and social reality does not mean (God 
forbid) defending some form of realism. 
Rather, it means realistically examining what 
can keep up with some puzzling phenomena, 
which affect not only the production of art-
works, but the art world as a whole. How is 
it possible that an architect such as Alvaro 
Siza has been able to realize beautiful exhibi-
tion spaces at the Madre in Naples but did 
not put outlets and switches in them? And 
the worst is that this great dysfunctionality 
was motivated by aesthetic reasons, much 
like what happened with the infamous Starck 
juicer. 
The ones I mentioned are the side effects 
of the rejection of beauty in art and the fol-
lowing genesis of the work of aura. The 
great “No” to beauty must be followed by 
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other agencies carrying out a supplying 
function – generating figures that were once 
unimaginable, like fashion victims, design 
maniacs, or compulsive exhibition visitors. 
Or strange couples like the one between hy-
per-architectural museums and the works 
contained in them. The museums are gener-
ally all different, except for the name, which 
is a variation of Moma. The works con-
tained, however, are all the same, all equally 
transgressive, all equally decided not to seek 
beauty (because if they did, they would be 
relegated in a more modest space, for exam-
ple, a design shop). Hence a paradox on 
which it might be worth pondering. Intimi-
dated common sense agrees that anything 
can be a work of art (and not a work of aura, 
a thing to which some conventionally auratic 
value is usually attached) . But at the same 
time design has taught us how difficult it is 
to produce good objects: it is not true that 
any object can be an object of design. As a 
result, if it is true that being a work of art is, 
for an object, something like a sanctification, 
while being a design object is, so to speak, a 
promotion of lesser rank, than it seems that 
in the twentieth century it was easier to be 
saints than blessed. 
Now, the salt-cellar by Cellini is cumber-
some, but it still can contain salt, if neces-
sary, while the Starck juicer will never 
squeeze a decent juice. What happened be-
tween Cellini and Starck? After all, it is a 
good question. I think the answer is simpler 
than it appears. The middle class (not neces-
sarily very educated, unlike the courtly and 
aristocratic patronage that had preceded it) 
saw the work of aura as an instrument of so-
cial advancement and enrichment. At this 
point, the industrial production of works of 
aura began, filling the galleries and museums 
that proliferated through the establishment 
of public expenditure in which officials 
bought with the people’ s money. And I’ m 
not at all convinced that museum directors 
would ever take home many of the works of 
aura they expose, nor would they ever buy 
them if they had to pay out of their pockets. 
Mind you: there have always been bad art-
works, the Louvre or the Alte Pinakothek 
are full of them, as anyone can see. Man is 
not perfect and, above all, perfection is rare. 
But what the twentieth century has managed 
to achieve is the ideological legitimacy of 
ugliness through the work of aura. I wonder 
what the archaeologists of the future will 
think, if and when they find the works of 
aura. Maybe they will not even notice, and 
consider as works of art those that are cur-
rently regarded as minor productions. 
 
Future Archaeologists 
 
In this regard I would like to suggest a re-
flection. In George Bernard Shaw’ s Pygma-
lion, a professor (Henry Higgins) is commit-
ted to transform a simple girl (Eliza Doolit-
tle) into a woman of high society. The topos 
is turned upside down by Mauro Covacich in 
L’ arte contemporanea spiegata a mio marito 
[Contemporary art explained to my hus-
band],27 where an educated wife or girlfriend 
takes a wealthy but unruly man out of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Covacich 2011.  
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abyss of ignorance and distrust of contempo-
rary art, by explaining word by word (but 
without too much arrogance) the sense of 
provocation wished for by Duchamp (urinal 
in the gallery) , Cattelan (Pope hit by mete-
orite) and Manzoni (poop in the box). Or 
why Marina Abramovic has spent her time 
stripping the flesh off some bones at the 
Venice Biennale. Or what is beautiful in 
Koons’ Kitsch.  
Covacich beautifully explains thirty art-
ists starting from a paradigmatic work, and 
does so with clarity and without technical 
jargon, as a good professor of art history 
would (even though he is trained as a phi-
losopher and is a professional writer). In 
Covacich’ s book, the husband is finally re-
deemed by the wife, and eventually under-
stands. A happy ending, then. According to 
me, however, even if she wins almost all her 
battles, Eliza loses the war – and it’ s not her 
fault, but the object’ s. While the initiation 
takes place, Covacich notes over and over 
again that Pygmalion, as she explains the art, 
thinks about his technological gadgets, that 
really fascinate him. What if Pygmalion was 
right? In fact, many of the recent works that 
Eliza explains to him (from Viola Calle’ s, 
still in the pre-digital era, to Barney and 
Hockney’ s, which concludes the review) 
hint precisely to those objects he longingly 
thinks of while she drags him into museums. 
One is tempted to think that those objects, 
filling advertising and the web as well as 
Pygmalion as Eliza’ s lives, do not emerge 
by contrast, but by association. This brings 
an afterthought: why come here to watch 
videos and installations when all this is 
available elsewhere, in the form of technolo-
gies and innovative objects of which the 
works displayed here are often the verbose 
echo? So, while listening to Eliza’ s explana-
tions, Pygmalion could bring out another 
book: Parole chiave della nuova estetica 
[Keywords of the new aesthetics], edited by 
Richard Fennel and Daniel Guastini.28 In 
this book there are 82 entries written by 38 
authors, and at least fifty of them concern 
precisely the age of technology: the smart-
phone, the camera, the flash memory and so 
on, while a significant minority regards the 
senses, taste, and slow food: the profit, the 
pleasure, the practical side and the repressed 
of the work of aura. 
Moral of the story: the work of aura does 
not prevent the peaceful or even aesthetic 
enjoyment of objects. The Transfiguration of 
the Commonplace29 that Arthur Danto at-
taches to Duchamp and Warhol has a spe-
cific background in Dutch interior painting, 
particularly Vermeer’ s, who successfully 
engages in a “transfiguration of the every-
day” (which becomes “acceptance of the 
everyday” in Edouard Vuillard). In fact, the 
Dutch have taught us long before Pop Art 
that there is always a potential artwork in the 
object. Nevertheless, this comparison re-
veals a deep affinity between the inhabitants 
of seventeenth century Amsterdam and 
those of twentieth century New Amsterdam: 
they share a deep bourgeois pride of posses-
sion of properties. Now, the affinity between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Finocchi, Guastini 2011. 
29 Danto 1981. 
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furniture and museums, as well as between 
object and artwork, is greater than one may 
think. This is the teaching of Mario Praz’ s 
An Illustrated history in Interior Design30: the 
representation of a chamber of the Prinz-
Max-Palais in Dresden dates back to 1776, 
one of the first pieces of evidence of a genre 
that was extremely successful in the nine-
teenth century, that of “an interior portrayed 
by itself” without human figures. This is 
similar to the watercolour at the Malmaison, 
started in 1812 and completed twenty years 
later, representing a sitting room with a sofa 
and an abandoned cashmere shawl on it. 
From another watercolour made in 1807 it is 
inferred that the shawl belongs to Josephine, 
Napoleon’ s first wife, who had left that 
chair twenty years earlier. A slight shiver 
runs through these desert interiors – perhaps 
this is why in furniture catalogues the adver-
tisers generally place happy people as well. 
In the room in which every living thing is 
absent, there lies the secret of being, of what 
was there before our birth and will still be 
there after our death.  
In the end, there is a relationship between 
the object and the environment on which we 
should reflect more. Goethe once wrote that 
it is not necessary that the real should take 
form: it suffices for it to hover around.31 
This principle is indecipherable as per the 
truth (what would an environmental truth 
be?) but it fits perfectly to the museum. Art-
ists argue that beauty is not the priority of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Praz 1964. 
31 Quoted in Heidegger 1969. 
artworks. Thus, beauty migrates elsewhere, 
hovering in the environment, with a transi-
tion from the ergon to the parergon, from the 
work of aura to its frame (already less au-
ratic). Then, from the frame, the aesthetic 
appeal may return to the fore, but not in the 
works of aura: it re-emerges in the museum 
shop, where you can find objects that par-
ticipate in the ritual and allow you to make it 
fit in your life in the form of bags, ties, pen-
cils and stationery. 
 
The Nude Readymade  
 
The work of aura has accustomed us (and 
I say “accustomed” to be polite, because as 
we have seen, there is also a bit of intimida-
tion) to accepting the thesis that “anything 
can be a work of art” (while it is true that, 
rather, “anything can be a work of aura”): 
buy a coffee-maker, exhibit it in a gallery 
entitling it “Melancholy at dawn”, and it will 
be a work of art. However (this, in my opin-
ion, is the original experience underlying 
Nespolo’ s works), if you take the same 
corkscrew and put it in a design shop, saying 
it is a work of design, the users will not 
agree to consider it as such, unless it actually 
works. Is it not strange? There seems to be a 
singular antithesis between the design object 
and the ready-made. 
In the case of ready-made, in fact, the 
idea is that anything taken from a standard-
ized production environment can be a work 
of art if it receives the blessing of the art 
world. In the case of design there is rather a 
search with the purpose of producing a good 
object, for which (unlike in the case of art) 
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the consent of the critics and a gallery is not 
enough. You have to deal with the needs of 
functionality, technical reproducibility, in-
dustrial feasibility and so forth. Design, un-
like Great Conceptual Art, cannot afford the 
romanticism, the surplus of meaning and 
aesthetic indifference. No, it must retain 
some classical balance between inside and 
outside, as well as between form and func-
tion. This highlights the unsaid of ready-
made, its dark side and its truth. As sug-
gested by the example of the museum, there 
is a relationship between the object and the 
environment. The urinal out of a museum, 
for example in a landfill, would not generate 
any kind of conflict – which shows that 
Duchamp was not fully sincere when he de-
clared his indifference of “retinal art .” On 
the contrary, he was very sensitive to this 
fact , but kept it to himself. 
Now let’ s come to the unique transfigu-
ration of the ready-made known as Brillo 
Box. It would be wrong to think that such a 
thing as a Brillo Box resumes Duchamp’ s 
urinal. Strictly speaking, the former has 
nothing in common with the latter. First of 
all, it is not a ready-made: it was manufac-
tured, with no practical purpose, especially 
for an exhibition, and inside there is no steel 
wool, because the box is much larger than 
the original, and if it contained steel wool 
would it weigh a ton. Just like the Pietà by 
Michelangelo (and unlike Duchamp’ s urinal 
or bottle rack) the Brillo Box was manufac-
tured to be an artwork. Far from being found 
and exhibited with a nihilistic gesture, it is 
literally (given its increased size) the magni-
fication of aspects of our lives, the life of 
mass society and advertising (with the 
soups, the divas, the powerful television) 
that is to say, “look at how beautiful your 
world is, look at that glow, look at the beau-
tiful women, look at the powerful men.” 
Warhol gives his works a strong aesthetic 
dimension: he literally magnifies (i.e. makes 
bigger and more obvious) Campbell ‘ s 
soups, Brillo Boxes and, of course, Marilyn 
Monroe and Liz Taylor. He does so for a 
simple and decisive reason, namely, that 
they are beautiful – which , again, can not be 
said of the urinal, or the bottle rack , nor of 
Duchamp’ s mariée. One might almost think 
that is the only similarity between Duchamp 
and Warhol consisted in having worked in 
New York. 
Brillo Box metaphorically refers to the 
ready-made only because it reproduces 
things that belong to the world of consumer 
items. So, it makes aesthetically pleasing 
what was just bad or insignificant in the real 
ready-made, that is, in Great Conceptual 
Art. More than a transfiguration of the 
commonplace promoted to art, Brillo Box 
appears as a secularization of the ready-
made, which limits the harsh and ugly pro-
vocations of Great Conceptual Art to the 
welcoming land of Pop. This process has the 
same dynamics and the same motivations as 
the relationship between haute couture and 
prêt-à-porter: take a abstruse phenomenon, 
an intellectual game without any aesthetic 
appeal and re-propose it in an infinitely 
more attractive and sensual frame (sensual 
and attractive at least as the boxes). Very lit-
tle remains of the original phenomenon: es-
sentially nothing, because Warhol’ s are not 
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real ready-mades, no more than Lichten-
stein’ s are real comics. However, their col-
ourful and ornamental pleasantness is enno-
bled by a metaphorical call for the big game: 
the game of Great Conceptual Art. 
Here is the secret that makes the work of 
aura tolerable. The public bears vexations 
(in the sense in which, with lucid humour, 
Eric Satie’ s titled his piano piece to be per-
formed eight-hundred times in a row Vexa-
tions) because beauty has taken refuge else-
where, away from the intimidation of Great 
Conceptual Art and the indulgence of 
Kitsch-Camp-Pop. It is in the elegant walls 
of the gallery, in the design of furniture, ho-
tels and restaurants, and especially in the 
amount of wonderful items that are pro-
duced industrially: things like the Olivetti 
lettera 32, smartphones and tablets, Japanese 
cars and markers, Moleskine diaries, juke 
boxes and Mont Blanc pens. These things 
are beautiful, and of course they are: their 
beauty makes them likelier to be purchased. 
They have a culturally recognized aesthetic 
dignity, so that at the MOMA and elsewhere 
they are exposed in the Design section. 
But wasn’ t this the best kept secret of 
ready-mades, namely the fact that the object 
has its own character, its own hidden 
beauty? In these objects, which are hastily 
called “minor art”, there is now the basis for 
the major art, for something that can over-
come the era of Great Conceptual Art. This 
beauty has always been there, waiting wher-
ever these objects are: in attics, flea markets, 
or in those wonderful archives of objects 
that are hardware stores. There, between 
nails, pliers, hammers, keys, screws and 
thousands of other objects classified in detail 
(how would you find them otherwise?) there 
is an inventory of worlds and therefore of 
possible stories, from which to draw hun-
dreds of novels (such as the couple buying 
hammer and nails to hang paintings in the 
new house, where he or she returns a few 
years later to get the locks changed) and es-
pecially of potential shapes whose aesthetic 
resources are under the eyes of all, and in a 
much less intimidating way than the works 
of aura. 
Let me make an easy prediction. It is hard 
to think that many of the works of the twen-
tieth century will remain, the priority of 
which was not beauty. Maybe a few will be 
saved for documentary and ethnographic 
reasons, or as a somehow sadistic curiosity, 
just as there are museums of torture or of the 
Inquisition. But objects will certainly re-
main. Designer ones, probably. But most 
certainly, more profoundly, objects tout 
court: they are the ones that remain by defi-
nition. Duchamp thought he showed that 
anything can be a work of art, but what he 
really showed is (thankfully) something 
completely different. On the one hand, as we 
have seen so far, he expressed a tautological 
argument: anything can be a work of aura, it 
suffices that we come to an agreement as 
with the emperor’ s new clothes. On the 
other hand, however, he brought attention 
to a condition that was far from obvious and 
yet is crucial, as well as antithetical to the 
hyper-conceptualism of the work of aura: 
namely the fact that the work of art is above 
all a thing. 
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 Many artists have followed Duchamp on 
the first path, that is, on the track of the 
work of aura, in a pursuit of gimmicks and 
wonders increasingly less surprising and 
more repetitive, in which the basic rule is the 
idea – worthy of the worst bureaucrat – that 
a certificate is enough for a toothache to be-
come a masterpiece. Far fewer have fol-
lowed him (or rather, contradicted and per-
fected him) on the second path, that is, on 
the thesis that the artwork is first of all a 
thing. But it is not too important, because in 
this struggle of concepts the big winner is 
always the object, with the Egyptian charm 
of its survival. 
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